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It is now more than a decade since Ray Watters and I published the first
of a series of papers discussing the findings of our 1984 research project
into New Zealand policies toward the Pacific Islands (Bertram and Watters
1984, 1985, 1986; Bertram 1986, 1987, 1993; Watters 1987). Central to
our analysis was a particular constellation of economic forces that we
labeled, rather casually, the mirab economy—an acronym made up of
Migration, Remittances, Aid, and Bureaucracy, and signifying an economic
situation in which current-account transfer payments (remittances, divi-
dends, interest earnings, social welfare payments, government budgetary
subventions, and a wide variety of other official transfers generically cate-
gorized as “aid”1) and nontradable production (generally dominated by
government, hence the term Bureaucracy), function as the leading sectors
in economic development, in place of the World Bank’s preferred mix of
export-led tradable production and private-sector investment.
Our original purpose in putting forward the mirab model was to chal-
lenge the thinking behind the strenuous efforts of aid donors and interna-
tional agencies, both then and now, to drive small island economies away
from what seems to be their natural and preferred pattern of resource
allocation under the international conditions of the late twentieth century,
and to force them into a development model transferred from mainland
Asia (and before that, from the writings of the classical economists). The
usually rather limited theoretical analysis behind island development plans
and international agency programs of the 1980s conceptualized the status
quo in Polynesia and Micronesia as “dependent” and “unsustainable,”
leading to the proposition that resources and policy support should be
allocated away from, rather than toward, strengthening and developing
that status quo. Enormous amounts of money and effort were then poured105
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106 the contemporary pacific • spring 1999into an attempt to trigger export-led growth fueled by private investment.
The money was welcome and useful, insofar as it reached the island econ-
omies rather than the pockets of overseas consultants; but much of the
effort was misdirected—more an ideological exercise in appeasing donor
prejudices than a well-grounded program for economic development.
A decade of very little economic growth2 was the result, and this real-
world experience seems to have contributed to a growing interest in our
1984 attempt to understand the mirab system as a steady-state economic
equilibrium, generated by market forces under conditions of market de-
regulation, fiscal and monetary discipline, minimal price distortions, and
strong outward orientation. This is not to say that Pacific Island nations
exhibit no policy-induced distortions and government failure; simply that
these are of second- or third-order importance for understanding develop-
ment performance. This is a region where governments generally balance
their budgets by letting spending change with revenues, where the balance
of payments current account is seldom far from balance and external debt
remains modest, where the mechanisms for generating inflation are mostly
missing, where gross inequalities of income and wealth are the exception
rather than the rule (and equalizing social feedback loops remain opera-
tive), and where problems of dualism are muted by the close integration
of informal and formal sectors of the economy. Small Pacific Island econ-
omies may not “pay their way” in the eyes of the modernization school,
but they do balance their books on a period-by-period basis, thus behav-
ing in the world economy in the same way as the cash-constrained eco-
nomic agents of some recent macroeconomic models.3
The starting points for the mirab analysis were, first, the observed
empirical anomaly that small island economies worldwide exhibit higher
standards of living than is predicted by classical, modernization, or de-
pendency growth models, combined with, second, the hypothesis that
common assumptions regarding the “unsustainability” of economies based
on migration, remittances, and aid might need to be reconsidered. In rela-
tion to development planning and economic policymaking, the mirab
approach highlighted the extent to which conventional plans and analyses
limit themselves to the goal of stimulating the economically marginal
tradables sectors, while virtually ignoring the main existing economic
locomotives.4 The result is that economic planners have committed them-
selves, usually unsuccessfully, to an attempt to subvert powerful market
forces in the regional economy and to defy revealed comparative advantage.
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sustain levels of expenditure (that is, standards of living) that run consis-
tently and apparently sustainably ahead of gross domestic product. A few
examples will illustrate the empirical importance of focusing on gross
national expenditure (that is, material standard of living) rather than
gross domestic product. Gross national expenditure is calculated by add-
ing to gross domestic product the commercial deficit on overseas trade in
goods and services. To provide a benchmark, figures 1 and 2 show the
data for two non-mirab Pacific economies (Fiji and Papua New Guinea),
illustrating the tight long-run relationship between the two predicted by
modernization theory.
Figures 3 to 7 show the persistent excess of expenditure over domestic
product that is one hallmark of mirab economies, whose spending power
includes transfer income as well as income earned from onshore economic
activity.
Conventional emphasis on gross domestic product as the key economic
growth indicator is based on the modernization view that expenditure can
only be sustained on the basis of local (geographically bounded) output.
The mirab model suggests that, on the contrary, external sources of
financing that do not leave a residue of debt—current account transfers—
are the key to the economic performance of small islands. Pacific Islander
populations became globalized long before most of the rest of the non-
oecd world, and several of the mechanisms described by neoclassical
“convergence” theory have been operative for some decades now—espe-
cially a tendency toward factor price equalization, which has underlain
the tendency for Pacific Island incomes to converge toward income levels
in the metropolitan Pacific Rim.
In a mirab economy the indigenous population maximize their mate-
rial well-being by management of the globalization process. Actual and
potential5 subsistence production from land, most of which remains un-
alienated under customary tenure, puts an insurance floor under living
standards by providing for basic needs, and possibly also for some modest
cash sales of produce to urban or export markets. However, it is the
release of family members and family savings from village agriculture and
fishing, and their outward movement to other sectors, other islands, and
other countries, that opens the way to securing higher incomes. Released
factors and cash are allocated across whatever geographical and eco-
nomic space the local population has access to, with the resulting income
Figure 1. Fiji: Gross domestic product and gross national expenditure com-
pared. Source: imf 1996. gne calculated by subtracting the commercial balance
of the balance of payments from gdp.
Figure 2. Papua New Guinea: Gross domestic product and gross national
expenditure compared. Source: imf 1996. gne calculated by subtracting the
commercial balance of the balance of payments from gdp.
Figure 3. French Polynesia: Gross domestic product and gross national expendi-
ture compared. Sources: Blanchet 1985; Poirine 1996. gne calculated by sub-
tracting the commercial balance of the balance of payments from gdp.
Figure 4. Western Sâmoa: Gross domestic product and gross national expendi-
ture compared. Sources: imf 1996; adb 1994. gne calculated by subtracting the
commercial balance of the balance of payments from gdp.
Figure 5. Cook Islands: Gross domestic product and gross national expenditure
compared. Sources: adb 1994, 1995. gne calculated by subtracting the commer-
cial balance of the balance of payments from gdp.
Figure 6. Kiribati: Gross domestic product and gross national expenditure com-
pared. Sources: adb 1994; Kim, Sidgwick, and Duprat 1995. gne calculated by
subtracting the commercial balance of the balance of payments from gdp.
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Figure 7. Tonga: Gross domestic product and gross national expenditure com-
pared. Source: imf 1996, 752–755, using cpi rather than the suspect gdp defla-
tor. gne calculated by subtracting the commercial balance of the balance of
payments from gdp.shared between migrants and their home communities by means of remit-
tances. This process includes employment in the large externally subsi-
dized government sectors, which puts cash into the hands of all house-
holds with members engaged in such employment.
Remittances, interest and dividend payments, aid, and other official
transfer payments, are sources of disposable income that do not arise
directly from the sale of commodities. Incomes in economies driven by
these transfers can be sustained so long as the transfer flows continue.
Over the past half-century, these funding sources have proven durable and
stable—see, for example, the per capita flow of real bilateral and multi-
lateral aid over the past three decades, shown in figure 8. This empirical
record casts substantial doubt on the conventional wisdom that regards
unrequited transfers as an unsustainable basis for material welfare. More
fundamentally, the size and persistence of financial flows into island econ-
omies from overseas, and labor migration out, have the effect of making
capitalist private-sector activity unprofitable because of the resulting com-
bination of strong exchange rates and high wages.
A historical perspective makes it easy to “explain” the high levels of
per capita expenditure in small Pacific islands by reference to the char-
acter of colonialism in the region. In all colonial Pacific spheres of influ-
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Figure 8. Per capita real aid to Oceania. Source: United Nations Statistical Year-
book, various issues. Total bilateral and multilateral aid flows in US dollars per
head, deflated by US consumer price index.ence from mid-century on, the living standards of indigenous island popu-
lations were raised and maintained by financial transfers from the
metropolitan powers. The fear that decolonization might go hand in hand
with “aid fatigue” among donors underlay the common ambivalence
toward political independence, and the willingness of many island popu-
lations to retain a high level of political tutelage. As Harold Brookfield
noted in the midst of decolonization, “if the available local resources in
these countries are inevitably insufficient to support either the transfor-
mation or maintenance of welfare at present and desired levels, then there
is no alternative to dependence but stagnation and retrogression. Indepen-
dence may give a nation self-respect,6 . . . but it is a self-respect that must
be severely constrained by awareness that the power of economic decision
making is greatly limited. To maximise self-respect is not accordant with
maximisation of either income or welfare” (1972, 141–142).
Bernard Poirine has developed, and investigated statistically, a model
of the factors determining per capita aid flows (including government
budgetary support) to a developing economy, and hence its ability to sus-
tain expenditure levels greater than domestic production (1995a, 204–
216). His three hypotheses are that, controlling for other factors, (i) islands
receive more aid than nonisland economies because of their greater geo-
strategic importance and greater per capita control over territory (includ-
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population (consistent with diminishing returns to variable population on
an aid flow determined by fixed territorial factors); and (iii) aid per capita
varies inversely with the degree of political autonomy of the territory.
In contrast to models that view aid flows as altruistic transfers subject
to “donor fatigue,” Poirine has argued that financial transfers are gener-
ally determined by maximization of self-interest on the part of donors
and will change only as the margin of donor calculation shifts. Aid
donors to island territories are in effect purchasing a valued service in the
form of a geostrategic footprint, the loss of which would have negative
spillover effects on the metropolitan country.7 Addressing the issue of
why the United States didn’t “completely abandon Micronesia after the
development of detente and the icbm,”8 T J Gaffaney made a similar
argument but with a subtly different flavor: international moral and polit-
ical pressure made it impossible for the United States to abandon prior
commitments without offending international opinion. Gaffaney suggested
that “even great powers in the international state of nature become bound
to commitments and may change their policies towards their dependencies
for reasons other than the great powers’ own interests . . . [S]uperpowers
may not be completely autonomous agents, but have become involved in
a complex web of international norms and standards for the treatment of
nonthreatening states” (1995, 50).
The sustained aid effort associated with US and French willingness or
determination to retain their Pacific presence certainly contrasts with the
downward trend in British geostrategic interest in the region following
Britain’s retreat from empire—but even the British withdrawal9 left a sub-
stantial residue of ongoing aid commitments in the region, while opening
the way to expansion of the aid spheres of other rising regional powers
such as Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Australia.
Even casual inspection of the size of aid flows and the degree of mobil-
ity of labor and liquid capital points to the likelihood that the mirab
approach is likely to apply more to Polynesia and Micronesia than to
Melanesia. The Melanesian economies are characterized by relatively
large populations and natural resource endowments, and by low inter-
national labor mobility. This closure of Melanesia’s international labor
market, while high mobility characterizes Polynesia and Micronesia, is a
reversal of the pattern in the first half of the twentieth century when the
Melanesian labor pool was integrated with the Australian agricultural
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Table 1. Per Capita Gross Domestic Product by Political Status, US Dollars, 
about 1990
All
Excluding Papua
New Guinea
Excluding Papua New 
Guinea and Hawai‘i
Sovereign territories 21,229 11,510 11,510
In free association 22,187 12,187 12,187
Dependent 22,615 22,615 14,423
Region average 26,351 11,979 15,046
Source: Bank of Hawaii, Pacific Island Fact Sheet.labor market while Polynesian and Micronesian populations had few
migration opportunities. Melanesian island populations, however, repro-
duce internally—via interisland movement—the patterns of migration and
remittances found on an international scale in Polynesia (Hayes 1993).
Small size combined with openness are necessary, but not sufficient,
conditions for emergence of a mirab structure. Smallness means, above
all else, price-taking status in the world or regional economy. Openness
enables world prices to flow through into the local economy. Given these
two, there remain two further requirements: sufficient political integra-
tion to secure access to aid and migration opportunities, and lack of a
conspicuously successful export staple—since the presence of a booming
staple erodes the political and social imperatives that generate aid and
remittance flows.
Across small-island Polynesia and Micronesia the mirab model in vari-
ous forms has been gaining increasing recognition. Outside the New Zea-
land sphere of influence where it was formulated, it has application to
French Polynesia (Poirine 1994a, 1995a; Blanchet 1996), the Federated
States of Micronesia (Cook and Kirkpatrick 1995; Cameron 1991; Gaf-
faney 1995; Hezel and Levin 1996), the other small US-associated Pacific
territories, Western Sâmoa and Tonga, and Chile’s Pacific outpost of Easter
Island (Rapa Nui). In Melanesia, as several researchers have pointed out,
a migration-remittance nexus is highly developed internally in economies
that lack access to overseas migration outlets—notably outlying islands of
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands (Hayes 1993; Friesen 1993),
and Kiribati.
The model has not had a clear run from academic critics. Anthropolo-
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effects of aid on the village economy (eg, Hooper 1993), and that the idea
of a “transnational corporation of kin” by means of which family groups
make decisions for individuals (or at least strongly condition individual
decision-making) lacks empirical ethnographic support (Friesen 1993, 237;
Munro 1990; Hayes 1992, 33). Others have complained that the macro-
economic focus of the mirab approach is “remote from the domestic
economies and even farther removed from the local ‘realities of place’ ”
(James 1993, 147). Agricultural economists complain of a supposed rejec-
tion of the possibilities for development of village agriculture in the
mirab model (Fleming, Hardaker and Delforce 1991, 125; Fleming and
Hardaker 1995, 1–26). And a constant refrain from the mainstream of
modernization theory is that the mirab economy cannot be sustainable in
the long run, implying that islands with this type of economic structure
are more, rather than less, vulnerable and fragile than traditional staple
export systems. (The model has suffered also a certain amount of willful
misrepresentation by bureaucratic elites in both aid-donor and aid-recipi-
ent countries, who notice that it threatens their preferred policy projects.)
I hope that I may be forgiven for not engaging in detail with all the
critics in the context of this paper. Instead I shall give some sketchy his-
tory of the intellectual origins of the mirab concept, and then pick up
three themes from the recent literature that identify, in my view, the most
interesting and productive areas for further economic research work. Those
themes are:
• substitutability among the mirab components, and thus a more de-
tailed classification of particular island economies within the general
framework and a move toward a more dynamic model;
• the microeconomics of the transnational kin or household unit and
the remittance decision;
• the growing body of (relatively) robust macroeconomic data that
permit cross-country comparisons to be made and the sustainability
of current account transfers to be measured.
Some Personal Recollections
In his excellent paper on the dialectical relationship of the mirab model
to the modernization model and its rebel offspring, dependency theory,
Hayes (1991, 25–27) included a section discussing dependency theory and
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Watters were active in dependency-related research in Peru during the
period 1968–1976, when Latin American dependency theory was at its
zenith. Both of us were products of the radically inclined geography
department at Victoria University, headed by Keith Buchanan in the
1960s. My training in development economics began with the twin influ-
ences of Arthur Lewis’s two-sector classical model and Paul Baran’s
Marxist theory of underdevelopment (the starting-point for the regret-
tably less rigorous later work of Gunder Frank; see Lewis 1954; Baran
1957; Frank 1967).
In Peru I first encountered a straightforward contradiction between re-
ceived theoretical wisdom and daily empirical experience, and was fortu-
nate to be part of an active social-science research community that was
prepared to follow its nose and rewrite theory accordingly. The depen-
dency model’s inability to explain how dependency relations could be
reproduced other than by sheer exercise of power by the dominant coun-
try led us to investigate the role of local economic and political elites in
mediating and reproducing dependent incorporation of national econo-
mies into the world economy (Thorp and Bertram 1978; Bertram 1991).
Peru was on the research frontier because of the Nasserite10 political
stance of military President Juan Velasco Alvarado, and the treasure trove
of historical documents that surfaced during the 1969 agrarian reform
and the highland peasant revolts of the era (Bertram 1974). Fitzgerald
(1978) was writing on Peru as an intermediate regime (Kalecki’s term for
governments seeking to position their economies in the conceptual space
between capitalism and socialism). Hobsbawm (1970) and Martinez-
Alier (1977) were pursuing the implications of “capitalist” elites which
sought to construct and sustain neofeudal modes of production to stave
off a peasant drive toward petty capitalism. Long and Roberts (1978)
were documenting the close organic connection of “traditional” highland
peasant communities in the Mantaro Valley, with their migrant members
in the formal and informal sectors of Lima’s capitalist economy. Cabal-
lero (1976) and Figueroa (1984) were surveying Andean villages and dis-
covering the importance of off-farm migrant earnings in family budgets.
Research on the food supply to Lima discovered that about one-third of
the nutritional needs of Peru’s capital city were being supplied informally,
outside any measurable market arrangements and apparently largely via
remittances-in-kind from the highlands. The choice for migrants between
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home communities was part of the Lima scene. And the informal econ-
omy was everywhere, demonstrating the strategic entrepreneurial flair and
opportunism of ordinary individuals and families in searching out niches
of opportunity in an apparently hostile economic environment.
By the time I returned to New Zealand in 1976, therefore, I was al-
ready critical of dependency theory as well as the mainstream moderniza-
tion model, accustomed to thinking in terms of the coexistence of modes
of production within a market economy, accustomed also to the idea of
individuals moving back and forth between modes and social roles, and
inclined to view geographically dispersed families and communities as
organic economic wholes. I had also had Keith Griffin as my tutor at
Oxford and so had an interest in finding ways to push neoclassical eco-
nomics to answer unorthodox questions.
My first direct collaboration with Ray Watters was a 1976–77 investi-
gation into a New Zealand aid project to upgrade pastures in the south-
ern Peruvian Andes. The project had been launched on the basis of an
agronomist’s casual observation of the apparent opportunity to introduce
better grasses and lucernes and thereby raise the productivity of “tradi-
tional” pastoralism in the region. Neither a historical survey nor a socio-
logical study of the local village economy had been done before the tech-
nical team moved in. Perhaps inevitably, our historical work showed that
nearly a century of virtually identical aid projects in the area had left no
trace of established improved pasture, and our sociological work suggested
that local peasant incentives were not aligned with the New Zealand
team’s objectives, largely because the rural poor were unable to capture
any of the economic surplus that might result from pasture improvement
and so, sensibly enough, went for short-term gain by grazing their stock
at night over the experimental plots, having first removed the protective
fencing for use as building material.
In 1979 I was asked to help with the first census of independent
Tuvalu, which brought me into Pacific research. We wrestled with the
inadequacy of the standard census definition of “de facto” resident popu-
lation in a small economy with a significant fraction of its labor force
employed offshore (on Banaba and international shipping); I met for the
first time the stunning discrepancy between export production and import
consumption that is the defining characteristic of mirab economies. A
week in Funafuti left me intrigued about the basis on which a small, soli-
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jobs went about the task of rationing this scarce supply of external
employment opportunities across its population of young males of work-
ing age. The Marine Training School that operated as the rationing
agency appeared to recruit its candidates on a basis far removed from the
strongly individualistic and elite-dominated process that would have
operated in Peru. Instead there seemed to be an implicit social contract
embracing the entire society that enabled cash-earning opportunities to be
spread, over time, across islands in the group and kin groups on each
island. Individuals were expected to rotate back into the local population
after a set period at sea, thus freeing up jobs for the next wave of the
school’s graduates—a process that made perfect sense in the Tuvalu set-
ting but violated standard neoclassical labor-market theory.
Five years later I returned to the Pacific, this time with Ray Watters
again, to evaluate New Zealand aid policies. We quickly found ourselves
at odds with the New Zealand Treasury’s drive to increase the notional
autonomy of Niue, Tokelau, and the Cook Islands by helping their politi-
cal elites to invent new “international personalities,” while trying to cut
them adrift from New Zealand budgetary support. Six months of
research later, the mirab model was born, to the consternation of New
Zealand officials who had commissioned what they hoped would be a
comforting academic prop for their policy objectives of geographically
bounded “development.”
Substitutability and mirab Typology
The term MIRAB spans two sets of current-account transfer receipts (remit-
tances and official aid) plus one sort of nontradable output, government
services (encapsulated by B for Bureaucracy). The term was coined rather
casually to capture the situation in the New Zealand–associated island
economies, and suffers as a result from two heuristic problems (apart
from its ugliness).
First, it gives the false impression that unless all three identified compo-
nents are present, an economy does not qualify for classification as a
mirab system. Poirine (1994b) has made this point forcefully by noting
the absence of out-migration from (and hence remittances into) New
Caledonia and French Polynesia, at least up to the early 1990s, due to the
exceptionally high local wage structure sustained by French budgetary
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Poirine proposed to call French Polynesia an arab economy. However, as
he has acknowledged in other recent work, the strong family resemblance
of the French Pacific territories to the structure of other Pacific mirab
economies justifies application of the model, once it is recognized that the
various components are potentially substitutes for one another,11 so that a
mirab system may operate anywhere along a remittances-aid frontier that
includes the corner solutions of French Polynesia, the Federated States of
Micronesia, and perhaps Hawai‘i (all aid, no remittances) at one end, and
a possible future Tongan economy (all remittances, no aid) at the other.
Second, the term MIRAB leaves out some varieties of current-account
transfers and nontraded production that belong in the model. For example,
a mirab economy can be constructed on the basis of receipts of interest
and dividends from overseas investments such as those held by Nauru
(from retained phosphate earnings) and Kiribati (the Revenue Equaliza-
tion Reserve Fund). Furthermore, nontradable production can take place
in the private sector as well as the public sector, as the recent debate over
privatization of infrastructural services illustrates.12 “Dutch disease” does
not automatically mean a disproportionately large government sector, so
that the “bureaucracy” feature of Pacific mirab systems has to be ex-
plained by factors other than just a high real exchange rate.
It is too late to go back and fine-tune the mirab terminology now that
it has passed into common usage. More useful and interesting is the clas-
sification of particular economies on the basis of their mix of the compo-
nents, and the related issue of the dynamics, and hence sustainability, of
mirab systems. Fortunately, due to sustained effort by a number of large
international organizations (especially the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the Asian Development Bank)
the stock of reasonably consistent macroeconomic data over fairly long
periods has been improving, and these data enable some comparisons to
be drawn.
The best place to start is the balance of payments current account.
Thinking of Pacific Island economies as cash-constrained in their ability
to purchase imported goods and services (including payments of interest
and dividends on foreign capital invested in the island economies) permits
organization of the data around the question: How do particular island
microstates finance their current-account expenditures? One extreme is
typified by Fiji (figure 9), which relies almost entirely on revenues from
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Figure 9. Fiji: Current account financing for imports of goods and services.
Source: imf 1996, 199–359.sale of goods and services on international markets to finance its import
requirements. A second pattern, exhibited by the Solomon Islands (figure
10) is to finance a temporary current-account deficit by heavy over-
seas borrowing in order to lay down investment in the development of
export sectors, in the hope of moving into long-run trade balance. A third
group is the mirab economies (figures 11 to 15), which rely on various
types of current-account transfer payments to finance a large part of their
import requirements. The Federated States of Micronesia (figure 11) is
mainly aid-driven, though export growth in recent years has been quite
impressive (due apparently to export-oriented industrialization using im-
ported migrant labor in Yap). Kiribati (figure 12) has quite diversified
sources of current-account financing, among which export earnings are in-
significant. Western Sâmoa (figure 13) and Tonga (figure 14) have moved
to a situation where private remittances are the dominant source of financ-
ing and a phase-out of aid has become a real prospect in the absence
of any significant export-led growth. Tuvalu (figure 15) exhibits a sur-
prisingly strong “export” base apparently composed mainly of philatelic
revenues.
The structure of these diagrams sets up a framework for thinking
about economic development options for small island states, and in par-
ticular the recurrent theme in Pacific discussion of whether and how aid
should be phased out over time. With standards of material welfare tied
Figure 11. Federated States of Micronesia: current account financing for
imports of goods and services. Sources: adb 1994, 200–203; Cook and Kirk-
patrick 1995, 10, table 6; Gaffaney 1995, 42, table 2.
Figure 10. Solomon Islands: Current account financing for imports of goods
and services. Source: imf 1996, 692–695.
Figure 12. Kiribati: Current account financing for imports of goods and ser-
vices. Sources: Gilbert and Ellice Islands Blue Books to 1975; 1976–1989 from
adb Key Indicators . . ., various issues; 1990–1994 from Kim, Sidgwick, and
Duprat 1995, 40.
Figure 13. Western Sâmoa: Current account financing for imports of goods and
services. Source: imf 1996, 806–809.
Figure 14. Tonga: Current account financing for imports of goods and services.
Source: imf 1996.
Figure 15. Tuvalu: Current account financing for imports of goods and services.
Source: adb 1994, 336–337.
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ties for profitable foreign direct investment, and with very limited scope
for sovereign-debt-financed expansion of either consumption or invest-
ment, Pacific Island economies must continue to balance their current
accounts in the medium-to-long run. The more-or-less-binding identity is
Imports of goods and services = Commodity exports
Imports of goods and services = + Services earnings + Income13
Imports of goods and services = + Remittances + Aid
Various development trajectories are consistent with this identity:
• Numerous aid donors have conceived of a process whereby com-
modity exports rise while aid and remittances fall, leaving imports
fully financed by sales of goods and services and the national econ-
omy neatly confined within its geographical boundaries. The end-
point of this transition would be the sort of current account exhib-
ited by Fiji.
• Many observers who assume that aid and remittances must fall over
time, and who discount the World Bank vision of successful export-
sector development, envisage a path of economic involution as per
capita import capacity falls and the economy is forced back onto its
own limited domestic resources,14 with material standards of living
falling accordingly, while the population remains confined within
the territorial boundaries. This might be described as the Kiribati
model. I am inclined to doubt that a falling path for imports and
therefore domestic consumption is politically sustainable for poten-
tial aid donors, and so to think there is a donor-feedback loop that
will either maintain aid levels at some floor sufficient to stave off
scandalous impoverishment, or concede freer access for migrant labor
to metropolitan economies. (For those island states already possess-
ing migration entry rights, the latter mechanism is already operative,
since out-migration can sustain the per capita import capacity of the
remaining resident population even in the face of an aid slump. In
these cases, donors face a trade-off between financial transfers and
Islander migration.)
• Others, including myself, envisage Polynesian or Micronesian devel-
opment as a process in which (i) commodity exports remain mar-
ginal (though any available export growth opportunities are obvi-
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creased) by geopolitical competition for control of Pacific air and sea
space and UN votes, or to maintain international “face”; and (iii)
remittances and other repatriated earnings rise steadily as the over-
seas investments of transnational kin groups mature. Import capacity
would thus be sustained, and potentially increased over time, by a
rising flow of repatriated income earned offshore, making the devel-
oped mirab economy rather comparable (albeit at microcosmic level)
to the UK economy of a century ago. This transition would yield a
current account structured like those of Tonga and (to a lesser
extent) Western Sâmoa, with import growth picking up from the
slump of the first half of the 1990s.
Microeconomics of the Family
The concept of Pacific Island kin groups as transnational economic entities
—what Watters and I called “transnational corporations of kin”—was
poorly developed in our original work, and accordingly attracted a good
deal of criticism on grounds of what Geoffrey Hayes (1991, 43) called the
“fallacy of misplaced familism”—that is, a tendency to idealize the neo-
traditional Polynesian family as being “harmonious” and “conflict free,”
and so able to make collective allocative decisions governing the geo-
graphical location of family members and the flow of remittances in a
purely consensual fashion. Abundant ethnographic evidence of conflict
and tension within Pacific Island kin groups, and particularly the contin-
ual dialectic between centrifugal forces of individualism and the centri-
petal pull of family solidarity (backed up by a variety of sanctions and
rewards), makes it clear that a much richer story of the behavioral, micro-
economic foundations of migration and remittance flows is required.
I concede that Watters and Bertram failed to articulate in detail the
decision-making model that implicitly underlay their model of migration
and remittances; but I do not accept that in using the ideal type of a family-
wide decision unit we were being naively idealistic about the structure
and dynamics of kin groups,15 and I still believe there is mileage to be
gained from the analogy with transnational corporations. Our concern
was to focus directly on what we took to be the distinctive feature of
Pacific migration on a comparative basis, namely the ability of Polynesian
societies to “become dispersed in space while still retaining some degree
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Hayes captured precisely what we had in mind: “The impression . . . is of
‘transnational’ communities consisting of two or more population ‘nodes’
separated by large distances while apparently maintaining similar social
relations of rights and obligations as would be operative in a previously
geographically bounded system” (1991, 9). And he noted that this view
of the migration process could be compatible with either a conflict or a
consensus model of social process. Watters and Bertram settled for a
consensus model and thereby attracted the ire of conflict-oriented re-
searchers, particularly anthropologists, but the resulting debate is a wel-
come one that can proceed within the overall framework of the mirab
model.
Recent progress in the economic modeling of transnational family enter-
prise in the Pacific has been driven mainly by Bernard Poirine (1994a,
1995b), who has addressed the issue of family decision-making using an
individualistic utility-maximizing neoclassical approach with a strong re-
semblance to Becker’s work. Poirine’s vision of the family consists of a
coalition of individuals grouped into overlapping generations, engaged in
a continually repeated optimization exercise over time. Individuals are
bound into the coalition by self-interest because Pareto gains are available
to all family members from joint decision-making on the education and
allocation of family members, for each of whom a life strategy is planned
and pursued. Migration and remittances are aspects of the implementa-
tion of a complex set of contractual relationships within the family, and
the ethnographic evidence of tension, conflict, and use of social control
mechanisms against errant individuals is interpreted as the usual institu-
tional arrangements for enforcing contracts and overcoming problems of
moral hazard.
A strength of Poirine’s work is that it has yielded clear, testable hypoth-
eses. It has also borne fruit in his collaboration with Richard Brown in
reworking Australian survey data on Pacific Island migrant communities
(Brown and Poirine 1997). More such surveys of immigrant communities,
at the sending as well as the host end, would be a very valuable area of
future research if funding were to become available.
My own approach to the microeconomic modeling of the transnational
family enterprise has a slightly different starting point from Poirine’s, in-
sofar as he treats the family as a “household” in the economists’ sense
(that is, an institution devoted to meeting the long-run utility or con-
bertram • the mirab model twelve years on 127sumption goals of its members) whereas I treat it as a “firm” (that is, an
institution devoted to maximizing the equity of its shareholders over
time). In the long run the two concepts should converge, in that an inter-
temporal model of a multigeneration household yields a sequence of con-
sumption decisions based on “permanent income”—that is, long-run
wealth. Use of a “family firm” model, however, raises more directly the
issue of how each period’s gross revenue across the whole enterprise is
allocated between consumption and investment (acquisition of real and
financial assets) and how investment flows are allocated to acquire assets
in different geographic locations and political jurisdictions. Use of a firms
model also avoids Poirine’s need to appeal to a market imperfection (the
gap between formal and informal capital-market rates of interest) to
motivate his flows of borrowing and lending. I agree that this gap prob-
ably exists, but I think that the transnational corporation of kin and its
remittance behavior would survive even if present capital market imper-
fections were removed.
I agree with Poirine (1995b, 40 n12) that the quest for a causal relation-
ship from aggregate remittances to aggregate savings rates in Foster (1995),
Brown, Foster, and Connell (1995), and Connell and Brown (1995) was a
blind alley.16 But the opposite relationship, from optimal investment plan-
ning by family firms to recorded remittance flows, remains to be ex-
plored. This really needs longitudinal survey data, but there is yet no
longitudinal survey of migrant communities under way in any of the
Pacific Rim destination countries. As a second-best alternative, econo-
metric work on time-series aggregate data will be worth pursuing.
From an economist’s point of view a great advantage of the mirab
model is that it provides optimizing micro foundations for its macro-
economic propositions, in contrast to the usual World Bank approach to
Pacific development, which is restricted to manipulating disembodied
economic aggregates. To capitalize on this strength, economists need
more debate on the processes of resource allocation and decision mak-
ing within the Pacific Island family, and more interaction with researchers
from other disciplines such as geography, history, anthropology, and
sociology.
* * *
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 8th Pacific Science Asso-
ciation Inter-Congress, Suva, July 1997.
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1 The term aid has to be used with great caution in the context of small-island
macroeconomic analysis, because of the extent to which it has become identified
in the minds of most economists with the subset category “development aid.”
The latter concept involves the provision of finance for investment projects with
clearly positive payoffs in terms of growth of gross domestic product. The former
comprises a much wider variety of payments, including current payments made
simply to sustain existing levels of gross domestic product, gross national expen-
diture, government services provision, or to restrain the extent of out-migration.
Intergovernmental transfers whose purpose is to forestall economic decline will
have their payoff in a zero rather than negative rate of economic growth. Evalu-
ating the payoff to such flows by use of the incremental capital-output ratio, as
several recent studies have done, will tend to lead to the unwarranted conclusion
that aid has “failed.” Properly designed evaluation of South Pacific aid perfor-
mance requires specification of more appropriate counterfactual elements than
merely zero growth. It also requires critical scrutiny of the extent to which the
reporting criteria of the Development Aid Committee of the oecd, combined
with political pressure to demonstrate concern for developing economies, may
have led many donor governments to classify transfer payments with no clearly
identifiable investment component as “development aid.”
2 At least as conventionally measured in terms of geographically bounded
gross domestic product. I and several others, including Bernard Poirine, have
argued that the properly measured growth rate for Islander communities dis-
persed across transnational space—that is, the rate of growth of per capita wealth
and hence “permanent income” for Islander kin groups—has probably continued
to grow.
3 Exceptions do occur, as recent history in the Cook Islands demonstrates,
but these departures from fiscal prudence are not sustainable and the subsequent
experience of retrenchment and stabilization provides a salutary reminder to
others.
4 A good example of this tendency is the otherwise excellent study of private
sector development options in the Pacific by McGregor, Sturton, and Halapua
(1992), which restricts its definition of “private sector activity” entirely to
domestic productive activity and regards export earnings as the sole sustainable
source of foreign exchange. Having noted the dominant role of labor remittances
in the Tongan and Western Samoan balances of payments, they dismiss the entire
topic of factor exports in a single sentence: “[T]he reliance on remittances is pre-
carious should barriers to migrant labour arise and as ties to home become weak-
ened through time” (1992, 10). Yet barriers to migration have proved consis-
tently easier for Polynesians and Micronesians to overcome than the barriers to
bertram • the mirab model twelve years on 129successful entry to export markets (McGregor, Sturton, and Halapua’s preferred
strategy), and remittance flows have been empirically more sustained and more
stable than export proceeds.
5 Large numbers of field studies by agronomists, geographers, and anthropol-
ogists attest to the existence of substantial excess capacity in islands subsistence
agriculture, in the form of both land held out of production and reduction of
labor input. Both these are, of course, reversible in the event of a change in the
incentives facing the owners of land. A risk for the future is posed by the current
trend toward alienation of land, often into nonindigenous hands, and sometimes
encouraged by international agencies giving priority to short-run output increases
over the longer-run viability of indigenous society and culture.
6 I do not, incidentally, subscribe to Brookfield’s ethnocentric conceptualiza-
tion of the necessary conditions for sustaining self-respect. In the cited passage
Brookfield is assuming a one-for-one mapping between the objective condition of
aid dependence and the subjective condition of lack of self-respect. It seems to me
that the mapping will vary according to the way in which the aid relationship is
mediated and sustained.
7 A graphic illustration of the footprint analogy is the substantial funding
provided by the United States for airport construction on Easter Island to pro-
vide an emergency landing site for the Space Shuttle program.
8 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, an innovation that dramatically reduced
the United States’ B-52 bomber bases surrounding China and the Soviet Union.
9 This was accomplished mostly during the Thatcher government’s period of
office, when Britain adopted a distinctively hard-nosed personality in the interna-
tional arena and refocused its geostrategic interests from the Pacific (where former
colonies were allowed to drift away to other patrons) to the Atlantic (where
Britain engaged in a substantial military campaign to retain control over South
Georgia and the Falkland Islands, and thereby over large areas of Antarctica and
potential oil reserves in the South Atlantic).
10 President Nasser of Egypt developed in the 1950s a distinctive style of
nonaligned authoritarian military government committed to finding an interme-
diate “third way” between capitalism and communism.
11 As Poirine (1994a, 2007) put it, “Emigration is only one of the alternative
strategies of international specialization for small island economies. . . . [M]ili-
tary or geostrategic rent . . . , international aid, and public transfer payments such
as social security payments, family allowance, unemployment benefits, and mini-
mum income allowance . . . all act as a substitute for emigrants’ remittances.”
12 The new focus by international agencies on microeconomic reform to raise
the efficiency of nontradable production is appropriate from a mirab point of
view, so long as it is borne in mind that the object of the exercise ought to be to
raise the volume of nontradables secured for given budgetary outlays—not to
130 the contemporary pacific • spring 1999slash the budget. Expansion of efficient nontradable production brings the thrust
of aid policy much closer to what a mirab analyst would recommend, by empha-
sizing the need for one-off increases in the productivity of aid expenditure and
allowing scope for improved governance, accountability, and incentives to pro-
duce positive spillover benefits for the island economies. A mirab analysis, obvi-
ously, would expect many of these spillovers to become apparent in the emigrant
as well as the locally resident components of the transnational kin economy.
13 “Income” in the International Monetary Fund’s balance of payments for-
mat covers repatriated interest and dividends on assets held overseas by the
formal sector of the economy, both government and private. Informal income
repatriation is classified as an unrequited transfer in the imf presentation.
14 This process obviously includes some potential import substitution, to the
extent that policy settings and regulatory barriers are designed to that end.
15 To elaborate a detailed defense would take too long for this paper. It is
however standard practice for economists to treat the “household” and the
“firm” as though they are maximizing individuals for the purpose of building
microeconomic models, and there is a huge literature on the institutional arrange-
ments for internal governance in these decision units by means of which maximi-
zation of their members’ welfare may be maintained as the overall objective
under conditions when it might be in the interests of some individuals to defect
from the club. In the particular context of peasant households, there is a long-
standing sociological literature since Chayanov on the making of decisions about
resource allocation (1966); the Victoria University variant is encapsulated in
Harvey Franklin’s work, which gives a central role to a “chef d’entreprise” who
may or may not be identifiable as a particular individual within the household
(1969).
16 Financial aid flows, being fungible, must be conceived of as supplementing
aggregate income rather than domestic savings, so that the ratio of incremental
investment to incremental aid will be given by the marginal savings or investment
propensity (see Griffin and Enos 1970; Papanek 1972; Gillis and others 1992,
381–385). So long as aid takes the form of a fungible flow of liquid funds, it
should be expected to have the same direct causal relationship with both con-
sumption and savings or investment as any other source of income. The same is
true of remittances if they are modeled simply as aggregate flows of funds into an
economy.
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Abstract
Developed in the mid 1980s to explain economic processes in New Zealand’s
sphere of influence in the Pacific islands, the mirab model has proved applicable
across a wide range of island economies. Identifying features of a mirab econ-
omy are heavy reliance on transfer payments, including repatriated factor incomes,
to finance current expenditure; a migration process that disperses the members of
ethnic groups across geographical space while retaining the organic unity of
families and communities; and a consequent transnationalization of the society’s
economic activity whenever external niches of economic opportunity become
accessible. Production of tradable goods is marginalized by the operation of
market forces in the absence of regulation, and policies to promote tradable-led
development have little application. The paper presents macroeconomic data to
illustrate three stylized facts for mirab economies: persistent gaps between
national expenditure and gross domestic product, a combination of large trade
deficits with balanced current accounts (and hence limited debt accumulation),
and the long-run stability of per capita aid flows. Some country-specific varia-
tions on the basic mirab model in the recent literature are reviewed, along with
some recent economic literature on the microeconomics of transnational net-
works of kin and community.
keywords: aid, development, globalization, migration, mirab
